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Abstract  
This study presents a model for studying the innovative capabilities of digital payment platforms in 
regards to open innovation integration and commercialization. We perceive digital platforms as 
layered modular IT artifacts, where platform governance and the configuration of platform layers 
impact the support for open innovation. The proposed model has been employed in a comparative case 
study between two digital payment platforms: Apple Pay and Google Wallet. The findings suggest that 
digital payment platforms make use of boundary resources to be highly integrative or integratable, 
which supports the intended conjoint commercialization efforts. Furthermore, the architectural design 
of digital platforms impacts the access to commercialization, resulting to an exclusion or inclusion 
strategy in accessing value opportunities. Our findings contribute to the open innovation and digital 
platform literature, by providing a deeper understanding how these digital platforms can be designed 
and configured to support open innovation. 




Digital payment platforms are multi-sided and layered modular artifacts (Rochet et al. 2003; Yoo et al. 
2010) that primarily mediate payment transactions between payers and payees. Due to recent 
technological advancements in payments, new interconnected digital payment platforms (e.g., Apple 
Pay, Google Wallet) are equipped with application programming interfaces (APIs), and software 
development kits (SDKs), which have the goal to foster platform generativity, and simultaneously 
enforce platform control on third parties (Ghazawneh et al. 2013). 
As such, new digital payment platforms create the foundation for (coupled) open innovation, and open 
business models (Gassmann et al. 2004), which is basically conjoint development and 
commercialization of innovative platform derivatives (e.g., apps) between platform owners and third 
parties. The growing prevalence of these novel payment IT artifacts, which are embedded within 
innovation ecosystems (Adner et al. 2010; Iansiti et al. 2004; Nambisan et al. 2011),  makes it for 
researchers, as well as for practitioners imperative, to understand how digital payment platforms can 
make use of external innovations from an integration and commercial point of view. As payment 
incumbents and start-ups utilize digital platforms to achieve their information systems (IS) and 
business strategies (Bharadwaj et al. 2013; Chen et al. 2010), there is notable paucity in the literature 
regarding how organizations integrate and commercialize external innovation.  
Consistent with West et al. (2014), they conclude in their comprehensive literature review on open 
innovation studies that sourcing open innovation has received abundant attention among researchers. 
Even so, there are knowledge gaps in how firms integrate and commercialize open innovation. 
Following the call by West et al. (2014) for more research in this area, the aim of this paper is to study 
how digital payment platforms create conditions for (1) integrating open innovation, and (2) how is 
open innovation commercialized that reflect reciprocal business interests. Thus, our research question 
is: How do digital payment platforms integrate and commercialize open innovation?  
To answer our research question, we expand on the work of Yoo et al. (2010) by delineating digital 
payment platforms into five layers: (1) device; (2) operating system; (3) network; (4) service; and 
lastly, (5) content. Secondly, we adapt the API management framework by Iyer et al. (2010) 
illustrating how payment providers develop their digital platforms and how platform derivatives (e.g., 
apps) are distributed. We argue that platform layer configurations have an impact on the integration of 
open innovation, by being either integrative or integratable towards third parties. Secondly, the 
findings suggest that the chosen integration type defines the attributes of commercializing open 
innovation. In this case, platforms follow either a selective or indiscriminant commercialization 
strategy with third parties. 
This research aims to have several contributions. First, our study complements the extant literature on 
digital platforms (Baldwin et al. 2000; Gawer et al. 2002; Ghazawneh et al. 2013; Iyer et al. 2010; 
Thomas et al. 2014; Wareham et al. 2014; Yoo et al. 2010). By providing conceptual clarity, this paper 
would lead to more concise digital platform studies. Secondly, by following the call by West et al. 
(2014), this study contributes to the open innovation literature (Chesbrough 2003) by delineating 
coupled open innovation. Lastly, this study follows the call by Bharadwaj et al. (2013) to unravel 
complex digital platforms and their business strategies. This paper provides insights into how digital 
payment platforms exercise open business models in the payment context. 
2 Theoretical Underpinnings 
In this section, we provide the theoretical background in understanding the logic of digital platforms, 
and how these layered modular IT artifacts support open innovation in regards to integration and 
commercialization. To derive our theoretical model, we draw on key concepts in the open innovation 
and digital platforms literature, which are serving us as theoretical lenses to study the innovative 
capabilities of digital platforms. Figure 1 illustrates our proposed unified theoretical model of digital 
platform innovation based on related literature. We argue that the design and configuration of digital 
platform layers have an impact in supporting open innovation, from an integration and 
commercialization point of view. The linkages between these platform elements illustrate correlations, 
and do not imply causality. 
 
Figure 1. Digital Platform Innovation Model. 
Support for Open Innovation   
Open innovation is the use and leverage of external and internal ideas to create new products and 
services (Chesbrough 2003), whereas the open business model is the commercialization of co-created 
ideas (Chesbrough et al. 2006). Studies on open innovation have identified three distinct modes in 
which firms practice open innovation within and across their organizational boundaries (Gassmann et 
al. 2004; West et al. 2014): (1) outside-in, (2) inside-out, and (3) coupled innovation. Outside-in open 
innovation is the integration of external resources (e.g., knowledge) into organizations to enhance the 
value propositions of their products ands services, whereas inside-out open innovation is the reversed 
approach of externalizing internally developed resources (e.g., patents) to the market, which may 
translate to adoption and profitability. 
Lastly, coupled open innovation has a dual approach, as it represents a combination of the 
aforementioned open innovation concepts, where value is co-created in a reciprocal, cooperative, and 
complementary manner (Gassmann et al. 2004). Taking digital platforms as an illustrative example, 
digital platforms support the notion of coupled open innovation, as digital platforms and third-party 
developers complement and integrate their corresponding services with each other. This builds the 
architectural foundation for future innovative platform derivatives in an iterative manner. As such, this 
kind of open innovation illustrates interfirm modularity (Staudenmayer, Tripsas, & Tucci, 2005), 
where organizations with external ones conjointly create and capture value.  
 
Figure 2. Three Types of Open Innovation. 
The open innovation literature has received substantial attention among scholars in their bid to explain 
the logic behind open innovation. However, by distilling a comprehensive literature review of 291 
open innovation publications, West et al. (2014) conclude that research on integration and 
commercialization of open innovation are notably rare: “This review has shown an extensive body of 
research on the front end of the process of externally sourcing innovation, but leaves major gaps on 
how such innovation is integrated and ultimately commercialized.” 
As digital platforms practice coupled open innovation, proprietary (e.g., iOS), and open digital 
platforms (e.g., Android) have evidently different platform governance mechanisms (cf. Ghazawneh et 
al. 2013), and organizational capabilities (cf. Iyer et al. 2010) in how innovations (e.g., apps) by third 
parties are integrated and distributed to create and capture value. It can be argued that the integration 
and commercialization of open innovation is to a large extend determined by the architectural structure 
of digital platforms, and how these structures (e.g., platform layers) are designed and configured. In 
the next section, we provide a working definition of digital platforms, which are layered modular 
architectures. 
Digital Platforms: Layered Modular Artifacts 
Digital platforms are layered modular architectures (Yoo et al. 2010), which have the capabilities to 
create rapid positive network effects (Eisenmann et al. 2006; Katz et al. 1985). We adopt the digital 
platform definition by Kazan et al. (2014), who state that a “digital platform [is] a proprietary or 
open modular layered technological architecture that supports efficient development of innovative 
derivatives, which are embedded in a business or social context”. Consistent with Yoo et al. (2010), 
this working definition is a suitable theoretical lens, as it describes the innovative capabilities of digital 
platforms due to their modularity. As these layered IT artifacts integrate and release controlled, or 
permissionless, innovative platforms derivatives (e.g., mobile apps) on different layers, digital 
platforms have the capabilities to support coupled open innovation. 
Digital Platform Layers: Five Different Layers 
Previous studies have laid the theoretical foundation to understand what digital platforms are, which 
are layered modular architectures (Baldwin et al. 2000; Baldwin et al. 2008; Yoo et al. 2010), how IT 
capabilities present the genesis of (digital) platforms (Hanseth et al. 2010), and how digital platform 
owners govern their systems, while balancing the act between control and generativity (Ghazawneh et 
al. 2013; Iyer et al. 2010). As such, earlier studies had a more generic view on digital platforms, where 
the unit of analysis was merely the service layer (cf. Yoo et al. 2010). Therefore, studies showed little 
attention to discussion of the different and interlinked platform layers, which have significant impact 
on platform configurations, and business models. Based on our working definition, we perceive digital 
platforms not as monolithic IT artifacts, but rather as five distinct platform layers (Kazan et al. 2014; 
Yoo et al. 2010). In doing so, the conceptual granularity allows us to analyze digital platforms in a 
more precise manner. We exemplify the five platform layers on the basis of Apple’s mobile payment 
service Apple Pay. 
The device layer constitutes a physical, programmable IT artifact through which stores process and 
execute digital encoded data and instructions. Apple’s iPhone and smartwatch embody these traits by 
being physical IT artifacts that store and run the Apple Pay software (integrated in passbook app), and 
initiate NFC (Near-Field-Communication) payments. The (operating) system layer represents a logical 
software system that executes and controls software, as well as physical IT artifacts. Apple’s mobile 
payment solution Apple Pay requires iOS and Watch OS as operating systems, to control the payment 
app (software), NFC chips and its secure element (physical). The network layer is the communication 
channel to transport data among different nodes. Apple’s mobile payment service relies on mobile and 
payment networks (e.g., Visa, AT&T) to process and settle payments (Kokkola 2010). The service 
layer constitutes software applications for storing, generating and distributing own, or third-party data. 
Apple Pay represents a payment service that mediates payment transactions, and addition, it offers 
APIs toward third parties to integrate Apple Pay into their apps (Apple 2014c). Lastly, the content 
layer is the representation of digital data based on audio, video, text and images. Apple Pay generates 
payment data, e.g., purchase amount, merchant, time and/or location (Apple 2014b). As digital 
platforms consist of five different layers, each layer has the capability to support open innovations 
(e.g., third-party devices). As digital platforms exercise different control mechanisms on different 
platform layers, this has an impact how supportive digital platforms are towards open innovation. 
Digital Platform Governance 
To align IS and business strategies of digital platform owners (Bharadwaj et al. 2013; Chen et al. 
2010; Henderson et al. 1993), digital platforms make use of boundary resources (e.g., APIs, SDKs) 
(Ghazawneh et al. 2013) to enforce their preferred platform governance scheme. To achieve this, a 
digital platform and each of its layers are accordingly designed and managed in regards to (1) platform 
development (self or co-development), and (third-party) service distribution (open or moderated). 
Therefore, the design and rules for platform development and service distribution (platform 
derivatives) vary among digital platforms, since organizational capabilities, IS and business strategies 
differ.  
To illustrate different platform governance options, we adapted the API management framework by 
Iyer et al. (2010), which is a suitable theoretical concept to explain the logic of different types of 
platform governance design options, in regards to platform development in an exclusive or inclusive 
manner, and the degree of control in how platform derivatives are distributed (cf. Kazan et al. 2013). 
Platform Development. We define platform development as the ability of and degree to which third 
parties co-develop and maintain a digital platform. Platform owners, which follow the closed notion, 
develop and set the rules on their own (e.g., the amount and the rules for APIs access), thereby 
excluding third parties. To illustrate closed platform development, Barclays’ mobile payment service 
Pingit shares these traits, as it is a proprietary and self-developed mobile payment platform. On the 
contrary, open platform development is the involvement of third parties, enabling third-party platform 
co-development. For instance, the payment startup Stripe is active on GitHub.com, an online forum 
and repository service for code sharing. By having an online presence on this service, Stripe (platform 
owner) and its third-party developers are co-developing the platform in a moderated process. 
Platform Derivative Distribution. We define platform derivative distribution as the ability and degree 
of freedom for third parties in distributing their platform derivatives. Digital platforms also 
differentiate in how platform derivatives are distributed. The moderated approach allows the platform 
owner to control and channel the distribution of platform derivatives. As an example, PayPal requests 
prior approval from third parties to use its payment APIs, to exclude e.g., undesirable merchants. The 
free approach allows third parties to distribute their services without prior approval by the platform 
owner. Coinkite, a Canadian Bitcoin merchant service, illustrates the free approach by offering open 
bitcoin APIs to third parties without interfering what service they offer. Based on the above-mentioned 
concepts, we can derive four different and generic platform governance design options: (1) closed and 
moderated; (2) closed and free; (3) open and moderated; and lastly, (4) open and free.  
 
Figure 3. Digital Platform Governance. 
3 Research Method  
The empirical basis for this research is a comparative and interpretive case study to examine how 
different digital platform design and configurations are impacting the support for open innovation 
(Walsham 1995; Yin 2009). As such, our study approach has an explorative trait through synthesizing 
and combining key platform concepts into one unified theoretical model (Figure 1). Based on two 
cases (Apple Pay and Google Wallet), the proposed model (Digital Platform Innovation) is guiding us 
in identifying similarities and variations between these two cases. We consider the case study 
approach to be a suitable method of inquiry, as it can answer “how” and  “why” questions within a 
contemporary, broad and complex setting (Dubé et al. 2003; Yin 2009). In this study, the complexity 
is reasoned as digital platforms constitute digital ecodynamics (El Sawy et al. 2010), which are 
embedded in innovation ecosystems (Adner et al. 2010; Iansiti et al. 2004). In doing so, digital 
platforms have to cope with internal complexities (i.e., internal IS business strategy alignment), as 
well as external ones, as digital platforms act as bridging technologies between internal and external 
systems. Therefore, a case study approach is deemed to be appropriate for grasping complex platform 
configurations, innovation and business structures. 
Research Context and Case Selection  
To study the innovative capabilities of digital platforms, we chose digital payment platforms as our 
context and unit of analysis. Digital payment platforms are particularly suitable to explore digital 
platform innovation, as the payment landscape is in the midst of industry transformation. New and 
innovative digital payment platforms enter the payment market (e.g., Apple Pay, Stripe), where 
established financial institutions are confronted with challenging market dynamics. More importantly, 
the application of accessible and affordable technologies is leading to disintegrations of once-
profitable business models (Jacobides 2005).  
We chose two prominent digital payment platforms, which have the capabilities and resources 
(technical and financial) to introduce a new and dominant design (Suárez et al. 1995) in regards to 
mobile payment: Apple and Google. Both technology firms are known for being cross-boundary 
disrupters (Burgelman et al. 2007), as they have the power to upset market equilibrium in rapid 
fashion (Downes et al. 2013). Furthermore, Apple and Google have different approaches in regards to 
platform control. Google is known for supporting openness (e.g., Android), whereas Apple is 
recognized for its walled garden approach (e.g., iOS) (cf. Eaton et al. 2015). Conceivably, these two 
different platform firms may have different approaches in regards to open innovation, which might 
provide additional insights from an integration and commercialization point of view. It should be 
emphasized that these two cases are illustrative examples, to demonstrate the applicability of the 
proposed digital platform innovation model. 
Data Collection 
The empirical basis for this study is based on two sources: one semi-structured interview (primary) 
and online data (secondary). We collected publicly available data from different online sources (blog 
entries, news articles, official documents by Apple and Google). To assist with our data collection 
efforts, we made use of the technology blog aggregator Techmeme.com. Blog aggregators have the 
advantage of serving as a filter, as they tend to highlight influential articles (Davidson et al. 2009; 
Eaton et al. 2015). In the case of Apple, the search was conducted using the keyword “Apple Pay” by 
limiting the time period from the 9th of September, 2014 (Apple Pay announcement), till 15th of 
November, 2014. Our search inquiry on Techmeme.com resulted into 68 hits. In the case of Google, 
the same method was applied by using the keyword “Google Wallet” between the time period 25th of 
May, 2011 (Google Wallet announcement), and 15th of November, 2014. Our search inquiry resulted 
into 119 hits. In addition to Techmeme.com, we crosschecked official documents by Apple and 
Google (i.e., FAQ lists on product and developer website and guidelines), if the online data was not 
sufficient enough.  
To support the data collection process, online data was imported into Nvivo 10, a qualitative analysis 
software program that allows a structured way to collect and categorize data. Data collection based on 
online sources has the advantage of being current, accessible and more importantly, verifiable through 
replicative studies. To complement the Google Wallet online data set, the case was triangulated with a 
semi–structured interview. We conducted an in-depth and face-to-face semi-structured interview 
(October 2014) with a mid-level manager from the Google Wallet unit. The interviewee was 
significantly involved in Google’s mobile wallet rollout (US and Europe) between 2011 and mid-
2014. The interview lasted 42 minutes and was recorded and fully transcribed. The interview questions 
were derived from the proposed digital platform innovation model. Apple was not interviewed, as they 
are known for being secretive and inaccessible. Nevertheless, the secondary data sources of Apple are 
rich and triangulated to provide sufficient data points to conduct a comparative analysis (cf. Eaton et 
al. 2015). Our interview strategy was to understand events and decisions on (1) how and why Google 
Wallet was designed and governed from an architectural point of view (e.g., platform layers and 
platform integration). The second goal was to gain insights into (2) the business strategy and its 
corresponding business model, and lastly, (3) whether or not open innovation was supported and 
commercialized. Semi-structured interviews have the advantage of allowing the interviewer to capture 
additional insights (e.g., publicly inaccessible data) that can enrich the model further. 
Data Sources Description 
Interviews One interview with a former Google Wallet manager. Interview duration: 42 minutes, recorded and transcribed. 
Press releases Apple Pay (7), Google Wallet (38) based on official Google Blog and Google Commerce 




Support Page Apple Pay FAQ Consumer: http://support.apple.com/en-us/HT201469 
Google Wallet FAQ for consumer: http://www.google.com/wallet/faq.html 
Google Wallet FAQ for business: http://www.google.com/wallet/business/faq.html 
Developer Page Apple Pay: https://developer.apple.com/apple-pay/ 






Apple Pay (68) and Google Wallet (119), (9to5Mac, ArsTechnica, Bank Innovation, Bloomberg, Engadget, 
MacRumors, New York Times, PandoDaily, Re/code, TechCrunch, TheVerge, Wall Street Journal) 
Table 1. Data Sources. 
Data Analysis 
After a careful review, relevant online data was selected and coded. The selection criteria were based 
on containing and supporting coding categories of the proposed digital platform innovation model 
(e.g., platform layers, support for open innovation). For analyzing the data, directed content analysis 
was applied (Hsieh et al. 2005; Potter et al. 1999). The coding categories were derived from the digital 
platform innovation model, serving as a theoretical guide during the analysis process. Directed content 
analysis is a suitable approach when prior or existing research about a phenomenon is incomplete or 
requires further explanation, helping to support or extend key concepts and theories. As such, the aim 
of this research was to study the integration and commercialization of coupled open innovation within 
digital platforms. 
4 Two Digital Payment Platforms: Apple Pay & Google Wallet 
Apple Pay 
In September 2014, Apple announced its much-anticipated mobile payment service called Apple Pay. 
Apple Pay makes use of interoperable Near-Field-Communication (NFC), which allows iPhone 6 
(iOS) and Apple Watch (Watch OS) users to perform both biometric (fingerprint and pulse) and 
contactless payments within mobile apps and at brick-and-mortar stores. Accordingly, merchants 
within physical stores are required to have complementary NFC payment terminals to accept Apple 
Pay. To mediate these payment transactions, Apple has partnered with credit card networks 
(MasterCard, Visa, AmEx) and with multiple banks, which ultimately process and settle payments 
between cardholders and merchants. In this context, Apple Pay serves merely as a proxy and mediator 
between cardholders’ (card issuer) and merchants’ (acquirer) bank accounts, thereby supporting and 
enforcing the existing roles and business models of financial firms in the current payment ecosystem. 
At its initial rollout, Apple preserved the exclusive right to have access to the NFC chip with its secure 
element; the latter stores sensitive payment details, i.e., payment tokens (controlled by credit card 
networks) and cryptogram (controlled by banks).  
To enhance its payment service further, Apple offers Apple Pay APIs free of charge to third-party 
developers, which allows them to offer Apple Pay functionalities within their own mobile 
applications, after they have passed the review process. For developers who don’t have their own 
payment processor, Apple collaborates with several online payment solution providers (e.g., Stripe, 
Braintree). These payment processors offer third-party developers an uncomplicated integration 
process, in accepting biometric-based Apple Pay payments. At the end, these processors charge 
regular payment fees. Apple Pay has the technical capabilities to generate highly contextual and 
valuable payment data, though Apple has not the ambition to utilize it. Rather, Apple supports current 
business practices, where financial partners continue in capturing valuable payment data. For security 
reasons and service improvements, Apple Pay collects only the location of the device, and date/time. 
The business model of Apple Pay has a two-track approach: the usage of Apple Pay is free of charge 
for end-users and third-party developers (subsidy side). There is no change for merchants in accepting 
Apple Pay, as they still continue to pay the regular fees to their payment processors. Moreover, Apple 
charges the banks (money side) with the help of credit card networks, which hand over 0.15% (credit 
card fees) of the transaction amount to Apple. 
Google Wallet 
In May 2011, Google announced its mobile payment service Google Wallet, an initiative to extend its 
advertising business to the offline world. At launch, Google teamed up with the handset vendor 
Samsung, which provided the first Android mobile phone (Nexus S) that was compatible with Google 
Wallet, allowing users to perform contactless payments. The phone contained the NFC chip, and the 
secure element, which stored a virtual credit/prepaid card by MasterCard (payment network) and Citi 
bank (card issuer). First Data (acquirer), which had the role of a Trusted Service Manager (TSM), was 
responsible to manage remotely the secure element. Google Wallet was a novel payment instrument; 
however, it faced considerable challenges during its rollout. Besides slow adoption on the user side 
and merchant side, large mobile network operators (T-Mobile, AT&T, Verizon) had no interest in 
supporting Android smartphones, which had a built-in secure element. Rather, they preferred to have 
the secure element in their controlled SIM cards. Secondly, as these mobile operators were also 
working on their own mobile payment solution (Softcard), they had little incentive to support a rival 
solution on their mobile networks. Absent from this joint venture, Sprint was the only US mobile 
operator willing to collaborate with Google.  
To overcome these challenges, Google released a new version of its mobile OS Android (KitKat), 
which allows storage of the secure element in the cloud (Host-Card-Emulation). With a cloud-based 
approach, Google Wallet is compatible with practically any NFC Android device, without requiring 
approval by handset vendors and mobile network operators. Moreover, this solution is also applicable 
by any other NFC service provider without Google’s approval. To extend its user base beyond 
Android devices, Google made its mobile payment service also available to iOS users (P2P payments 
only). Over time, Google was also successful in teaming up with the remaining payment networks 
Visa, AmEx and Discover, as Google Wallet agreed to support their existing fee-based business 
models. The value proposition toward merchants to accept Google Wallet is that it is tightly integrated 
with Google’s location-aware promotion offers (e.g., loyalty and offers). Besides regular payment fees 
to payment processors, merchants can use Google Wallet and its promotion functionalities on different 
third-party online channels free of charge, after passing a review process. Google, however, charges 
merchants fees as soon as online properties by Google are used (e.g., AdWords).  
To build a community around its payment service, Google Wallet offers APIs, allowing third parties to 
ingrate payment functionalities/promotions into their own Android/iOS apps and mobile and desktop 
websites, free of charge. However, Google differs from Apple, in that it doesn't provide a list of 
recommended payment processors, leaving third-party developers unsupported to a certain degree. 
Google Wallet collects payment data much like Apple Pay, such as merchant, payment amount, date 
and time, method of payment and location. As such, the business model for Google Wallet is primarily 
designed to extend Google’s online advertising business. 
5 Analysis  
Platform Layers and Governance 
Device Layer. Apple issues proprietary device layers (i.e., iPhone, Apple Watch) with built-in NFC 
chips and secure elements. In doing so, Apple preserves the exclusive right to produce, modify and 
configure any hardware components. On the contrary, the Google Wallet service relies on open device 
layers (Android handsets), which are manufactured and provided by third parties. To illustrate the 
open device layer strategy of Google Wallet, the Google manager states: “We want [service] ubiquity 
[…] we need a partnership with an OEM (original equipment manufacturer) right now.” Furthermore, 
he states: “Let's find a way to [remove] the OEM from needing to be part of the process. So let's 
release host card emulation, [where] no hardware is needed, […] if a phone has NFC […and] it's 
running Android, it's done”. Implications: We therefore propose that the Apple Pay device layer is 
closed (i.e., proprietary), whereas the Google Wallet device layer is open and free in supporting third 
parties to manufacture and distribute Android devices. 
System Layer. To be functional, Apple Pay requires iOS and Watch OS, which are proprietary system 
layers by Apple. Conversely, Google Wallet operates on Android, which is open source (i.e., Android 
Open Source Project), representing an open system layer. Overall, the closed system layers of Apple 
Pay are tightly integrated with closed Apple device layers, offering better configurations options in 
regards to technology and user experience. On the other hand, Google Wallet’s system layer is open, 
and can be integrated within various open Android devices in an agnostic manner. By keeping the 
device and system layers open to external stakeholders, Google Wallet creates the conditions for 
service ubiquity on many Android devices. Implications: We therefore propose that the Apple Pay 
system layer (e.g., iOS) is closed (i.e., proprietary), whereas the Google Wallet system layer (i.e., 
Android) is open and free to create and distribute custom operating systems for various Android 
devices. 
Network Layer. Apple Pay and Google Wallet have cooperative arrangements with payment networks 
and with banks, which have granted access to their financial networks to processes and settle Apple 
Pay and Google Wallet transactions. In addition, both services rely on mobile network operators to 
send payment transactions. Implications: We therefore propose that the network layer of Apple Pay 
and Google Wallet are closed, (controlled by financial institutions and telecom operators), and free, as 
these networks distribute payment services without major interferences. 
Service Layer. Apple Pay offers third-party developers SDKs and APIs to integrate the Apple Pay 
functionality (biometric only) into their own and approved mobile application, which are distributed 
through Apple’s App Store at the end. Likewise, Google Wallet offers SDKs and APIs to approved 
third-party developers. As the Google manager states: “They're public APIs; there are terms and 
conditions that are associated with them […] it's kind of like a click and accept agreement type.” 
However, Google Wallet exceeds Apple Pay by being highly integratable into various external 
channels, such as email, mobile and desktop webpages. Implications: We therefore propose that the 
service layer of Apple Pay is closed (i.e., proprietary) and moderated, as Apple controls third-party 
app distributions through its App Store. In contrast, the service layer of Google Wallet is closed (i.e., 
proprietary), but free, as it allows third parties to distribute the Google Wallet service on various 
channels without major interventions. 
Content Layer. For Apple Pay, the payment data is opaque, since Apple does not collect the data. 
Rather, it supports existing business practice and data sovereignty by allowing credit card firms and 
banks to have exclusive data collection rights. According to Eddy Cue, Apple’s Senior Vice President 
of Internet Software and Services: “Apple doesn’t collect your purchase history, so we don’t know 
what you bought, where you bought it or how much you paid for it,” [stating that] “the transaction is 
between you, the merchant and your bank.” (Apple 2014a) Google Wallet collects payment data 
cooperatively with credit card firms, and banks data in the form of location, merchant name, amount, 
date/time and method of payment. The Google manager states: “The data that Google Wallet was 
receiving was the same data that MasterCard and Visa were receiving […]. Furthermore, the manager 
emphasizes “What really matters is not basket-level data but item-level data […].” As such, Google 
has rather a long-term view in commercializing payment data. Implications: We therefore propose that 
the content layers of Apple Pay and Goggle Wallet are closed (i.e., proprietary), as payment data is not 
accessible by third parties (e.g., developers), except it is shared with its core business partners (i.e., 
banks and credit card firms). 
 














 Apple Pay does not collect payment data. 
Credit card firms & banks have data 
sovereignty over payment data. 
Google Wallet collects payment data 
cooperatively with its business partners. 
Closed: both payment platforms have closed 






Apple Pay offers SDKs and APIs to app 
developers & payment processors (e.g., 
Stripe), enabling them to integrate Apple 
Pay into their iOS-based services. 
 
Google Wallet offers SDKs and APIs to third-
party developers, to integrate payment & 
promotion into their email, mobile apps and 
web services. 
Apple Pay: Closed & Moderated 
Apple controls the service layer, and moderates 
the distribution of third-party services. 
Google Wallet: Closed & Free 
Google controls the service layer, but does not 






Apple collaborates with three credit card 
firms (MasterCard, Visa, AmEx) and with 
the consent of multiple banks to process 
and settle biometric and contactless 
mobile payments.  
Google partnered with two credit card firms 
(MasterCard, Discover) & with one bank to 
store & process any payment card without prior 
approval of the card issuer. 
Closed & Free 
Both payment platforms rely on closed and 
externally owned networks layers, though the 





 Apple Pay uses proprietary mobile operating systems (iOS/Watch) to be 
operational. 
Google Wallet requires Android (KitKat or 
higher), which is an open source mobile 
operating system (i.e., Android Open Source 
Project). 
Apple Pay: Closed 
Apple controls the system layer 
Google Wallet: Open & Free 






Apple Pay functions on proprietary 
mobile devices, which are controlled by 
Apple. 
Google Wallet functions with any NFC Android 
phone produced by third-party handset vendors. 
Apple Pay: Closed 
Apple controls the device layer. 
Google Wallet: Open & Free 
Google does not control the system layer or its 
distribution. 
Table 2. Comparative Platform Analysis. 
6 Discussion and Conclusion 
The aim of this study is to advance the digital platform and open innovation literature that sheds light 
on how digital platforms are designed and configured to utilize open innovation. Following the call by 
(West et al. 2014) for more studies on how organizations integrate and commercialize open 
innovation, this paper investigates how digital payment platforms perform third-party integration and 
commercialization. 
Open Innovation Integration  
Both digital payment services make use of boundary resources (SDKs and APIs) on the service layer 
to ensure integration conditions for open innovation (Ghazawneh et al. 2013), though both digital 
payment platforms differ as to how integration is accomplished. Apple Pay has an integrative 
approach to open innovation, as third parties are compelled to integrate their services into Apple’s 
platform (i.e., outside-in). For instance, developers of iOS applications with built-in Apple Pay are 
required to submit their applications to Apple to pass the review process, which are afterwards 
exclusively distributed through Apple’s App Store. Accordingly, the findings suggest that Apple’s 
capability to enforce an integrative approach to open innovation can be argued, as Apple’s platform 
layers are tightly integrated with each other, achieved by designing, configuring and offering primarily 
closed and moderated platform layers. As such, Apple performs coupled open innovation by offering a 
coupled modular platform architecture, which requires from third parties to follow Apple’s integration 
rules in order to have the opportunity to capture value. Google’s payment solution has a reverse 
approach in regards to integration. Google Wallet is designed to be highly integratable into various 
external services and systems (i.e., inside-out) in providing the conditions for co-creating value. 
Taking the service layer and the device layer as an example, third parties are free in their choice as to 
how Google Wallet is integrated into external systems (service layer). Furthermore, Google does not 
dictate which NFC Android handset is used (i.e., device layer) to perform contactless payments, as 
independent third-party handset vendors manufacture and control these Android devices. Based on 
these results, Google’s capability to practice an integratable approach to open innovation can be 
argued as Google Wallet’s platform layers are loosely coupled, which is achieved by designing, 
configuring, and offering primarily open and free platform layers. As such, Google achieves coupled 
open innovation through its decoupled modular architecture, allowing third parties the flexibility in 
integrating Google Wallet, in order to have the opportunity to capture value. 
Open Innovation Commercialization  
Based on the above-mentioned observations, Apple Pay has a selective commercialization strategy by 
controlling access to value. Apple takes the freedom to decide with whom it does business by 
leveraging boundary resources (i.e., SDKs and APIs) and its coupled modular architecture against 
external stakeholders, thereby granting qualified access to value capture opportunities. As an example, 
Apple denied Adobe access to Apple’s service layer (i.e., Safari browser) in integrating its graphic 
standard “Flash” due to performance issues (cf. Eaton et al. 2015). In doing so, Apple ensures 
monopolistic power on its platform layers. We therefore propose that Apple performs with its 
integrative approach to open innovation an exclusion commercialization strategy to value access. 
Contrasting Google’s payment service, Google Wallet has an indiscriminate commercialization 
strategy by opening access to value. To achieve service ubiquity, Google leverages boundary 
resources (i.e., SDKs and APIs), and its decoupled modular architecture to be highly integratable into 
external stakeholder systems, thereby providing ubiquitous access to value capture opportunities. For 
instance, in introducing a cloud-based NFC payment solution (i.e., host card emulation), Google 
relinquished control of the device layer, a domain previously controlled by handset vendors and 
telecom operators. In doing so, Google ensures service ubiquity, which is driven by third parties on the 
device and system layer. We therefore propose that Google performs with its integratable approach to 
open innovation an inclusion strategy to value access. 
Apple Pay Google Wallet 
Integrative Open Innovation:  
Apple Pay makes use of SDKs and APIs to be highly integrative 
into Apple’s platform (i.e., device and service layer). 
Selective Commercialization: 
Apple Pay performs with its integrative approach on open 
innovation an exclusion strategy to access value. 
Integratable Open Innovation:  
Google Wallet makes used of SDKs and APIs to be highly integratable 
into various external third-party systems 
Indiscriminate Commercialization:  
Google performs with its integratable approach on open innovation an 
inclusion strategy to access value. 
Table 3. Support for Open Innovation. 
Theoretical & Practical Implications 
This study contributes to the platform (Gawer et al. 2002; Ghazawneh et al. 2013; Iyer et al. 2010; 
Thomas et al. 2014; Yoo et al. 2010) and open innovation literature (Chesbrough 2003; West et al. 
2014) by bridging knowledge gaps in how digital (payment) platforms integrate and commercialize 
open innovation. The findings suggest that the studied digital platforms utilize two different modes of 
open innovation integration (i.e., being integrative and integratable). Ultimately, these two types of 
integrations have an impact on how access to commercialization is granted, resulting in either an 
exclusion or inclusion strategy in accessing value opportunities. From the practitioner’s point of view, 
we provide decision support by increasing the awareness of different digital platform configuration 
options they have to provide and access platform value. This paper is constrained in its 
generalizability, as it used only two cases. Relevant avenues for future research are available in terms 
of configuration of digital (payment) platforms. In this study we have illustrated that different platform 
layer configurations (decoupled and coupled modular architecture) are leading to the same service 
offering. The question arises whether different platform design configurations with the same outcome 
are equally successful. 
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